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Abstract                                                                                                                                
Corporate governance has ignited heightened interest with the collapse of key companies round the world. The 
demise of Enron, Arthur Anderson, Health Smith and others took the entire globe by surprise. All the 
stakeholders are now very interested in setting standards and enacting laws that address current issues to protect 
unsuspecting investors. In this regard, the United States Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to 
guide the practice of corporate governance particularly in the public corporation of the country. This paper thus 
examined the issue of agency as it relates to corporate governance. It attempted to determine the extent to which 
the directors and management of banks are in congruent with this role. It also assessed the impact of agency on 
corporate governance in the Nigerian banking sector. In carrying out this study simple percentages through the 
aid of frequency distribution were used to describe the data collected. T-test statistic was employed to analyse 
the data. and in conclusion, the study was of the view that agency impacts negatively on corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. The study therefore recommended that the banking sector should endeavour to entrench 
effective corporate governance that will compel the directors and the management to be truly and genuinely 
accountable to the stakeholders. It also recommended that the Central Bank of Nigeria should strengthen its 
enforcement mechanisms such that there will be total transparency and full disclosure of all material transactions 
to the stakeholders and the regulatory authorities.   
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Agency, Banking Sector, Directors, Transparency, Disclosure Stakeholders, 
Management    
 
1  Introduction 
 
Anameje (2007) asserts that the subject of corporate governance has of recent, assumed a global significance 
having been found to be crucial for sustainable corporate performance. The incredible collapse of a number of 
corporate giants which were believed to be the front-liners in business performance has brought to the fore the 
need for greater transparency and accountability in corporate management. It is instructive to note that there is 
hardly any sector of the Nigerian economy that has not suffered the consequences of lack of good corporate 
governance practice. This is underscored by the on-going efforts of the Federal Government of Nigeria at 
entrenching accountability and transparency in both the public and private sectors of the economy. Sanusi (2004) 
observes that “we have witnessed the collapse of many public corporations as well as private business 
organizations and the attendant negative implications for economic growth and development”. Such perverse 
consequences tend to become extremely worrisome when one realizes that the banking sector has been the worst 
hit especially since the 1990s. 
 
The issue of agency has played a paramount role in corporate governance. The management and the board of 
directors of companies  are  agents  whose role is to act in the best interest of the stakeholders. Unfortunately, the 
objectives of these agents are often at variance with those of the firms’ stockholders as well as those of the other 
stakeholders. Van Horne (2002) opines that in a large corporation, the stock may be so widely held that 
stockholders cannot even make known their objectives, much less control  or influence management. Often, 
ownership and control are separate, a situation that allows management to act in its own best interest rather than 
those of its stockholders. In a bid to forestall the greed and the selfish interest, of the management, a good 
number of the privately-owned banks had the ownership and management concentrated, in most cases, in a 
single hand, representing the interest of the family controlled banks. 
 
Agency problem has therefore become another challenging area in corporate governance in the Nigerian banking 
sector  which requires a serious attention otherwise, with  the  total separation of ownership from management as 
demanded  by the latest Banking Sector Reforms, the agents, who are the management and the board, may 
continue to  take undue advantage of the innocent stakeholders. Rather than maximizing the wealth of the 
stockholders and protecting the interest of the entire stakeholders, the agents will pursue their own objectives 
instead. 
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1.1  Statement of the Problem  
Corporate governance structures in banks rest solely on three principal actors: the board of directors, 
management and the shareholders. The directors and the senior management act as agents in the running of the 
company and are accountable to the shareholders. While Sanusi (2002) contends that the board should ensure 
that the bank is run with integrity, complies with all legal requirements and regulatory standard and conduct its 
business in accordance with high ethical standard, Diplock (2004),opines that  for a board to function effectively, 
it should be composed of members who are independent, skilled, knowledgeable, experienced and of diverse 
perspectives. Adedipe (2004) on the other hand, is of the view that ownership must be separated from the day to 
day running of the firm.   
The agency theory however is of the position that in the presence of information asymmetry, the agent who may 
be a director or a manager is likely to pursue interests that may hurt the principal or share-holders (Ross, 1973; 
Fama, 1980). The owners had imperfect information concerning the opportunities facing managers and could not 
by looking at outcomes, infer, whether or not, managers had made the decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).    
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), focus on the contract of an agency relationship between the principal and the agent. 
They demonstrate that as the owner’s manager’s fraction of the equity falls, the utility maximizing agent has the 
incentive to appropriate a large amount of the corporations’ resources in the form of perquisites and to exert less 
than full efforts to create value for shareholders. Akinsulire (2002) observes that in larger companies, ordinary 
shares are likely going to be diversely held and so the actions of shareholders are likely going to be restricted in 
practical terms. The management of an organization is essentially agents for the shareholders, being tasked with 
running the organization in the shareholders’ best interests. The shareholders however have little opportunity to 
assess whether the managers are acting in the shareholders’ best interests. 
 
There is a serious absence of financial disclosure which would have strengthened the accountability of directors 
and senior management and enhance the incentives for risk management. To worsen the situation, Oluyemi 
(2005) observes that there is a huge non-performing loans attributable to the directors of the banks. This would 
have been made possible as a result of the directors and management embarking on the pursuit of their selfish 
interest which is to the detriment of the stakeholders. Because the agents are seen as not acting in the best 
interest of the stockholders the tenets of good corporate governance and agency are often difficult to preserve.   
 
1.2    Objectives of  the Study:  
 
(i) To examine the issue of agency in corporate governance within the Nigerian banking sector 
(ii) To determine the extent to which the directors and management of banks carry out  this role 
(iii) To explore the significant relationship between corporate governance and agency 
(iv) To assess the impact of agency on corporate governance in the sector.  
                                                   
2   Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
 
According to Mulbert (2009), a generally accepted definition of corporate governance has not yet evolved. 
Traditional concepts describe corporate governance as a complex set of constraints that shape the ex post 
bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a firm or as every device, institution or mechanism that exercises 
power over decision making within a firm (Zingales, 2008 and Macey 2008). Put differently, corporate 
governance deals with the decision- making at the level of the board of directors and top management (i.e., the 
management board in a two-tier system), and the different internal and external mechanisms that ensure that all 
decisions taken by the directors and top management are in line with the objectives(s) of a company and its 
shareholders respectively.  
 
The most widely accepted definition of corporate governance embodied in the OECD principles of Corporate 
Governance and referred to in the European Commission’s Action Plan on Company Law and Corporate 
Governance takes a slightly broader view: “Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”. Corporate governance also provides 
the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for 
the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders, and 
should facilitate effective monitoring. This definition goes beyond the definitions cited above mainly insofar as a 
company’s objectives(s) and the mechanism for setting the objective(s) are treated as a corporate governance 
issue, not as endogenously given.  
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By contrast, a much broader definition describes corporate governance as encompassing the standards for 
decision-making within a company, the duties of board members and officers, the internal structure of the firm 
(enterprise) and the relationship between the corporation and its shareholders and other stakeholders. Such a 
concept of corporate governance goes beyond even the OECD’s definition in two respects: first, by implying that 
corporate governance also deals with substantive management issues and the pertinent decision-making by the 
board and top management, for example, by requiring them to set up an independent compliance function and a 
risk-management system, and second, by dealing with the internal structure of the firm, i,e. with internal 
structures below the level of the company’s board and officers (top management).  
 
Monks and Minow (1995) state that corporate governance is the relationship among various participants in 
determining the direction and performance of corporations. Tricker (1994), opines that “corporate governance 
addresses the issues facing the board of directors, such as the interaction with top management, and the 
relationship with the owners and other interested parties in the affairs of the company including creditors, debt 
financiers, analysts, auditors and corporate regulators”. ’Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance 
by stating that’ it deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment. A similar concept is suggested by Caramanolis-Cotelli (1995) who regards corporate 
governance as being determined by the equity allocations among insiders (including executives, chief executive 
officers (CEO’s), directors or others individuals (corporate or institutional investors who are affiliated with 
management) and outside investors.    
 
Owoh (2006) observes that corporate governance is concerned with a clear distinction between the top 
management’s operational processes, and the highest-level policy-based structure of an organization. The 
governance structure formulates policies and gives general road-map for the organization, while the top 
management breaks down these polices into implementable bits and follows-through same in the course of its 
daily operations.    John and Senbet (1998) propose a more comprehensive definition that “corporate governance 
deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insider and 
management such that their interests are protected”. They include as stakeholders, not just share holders, but also 
debt holders and even non-financial stakeholders such as employees, customers and other interested parties.  
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states that “corporate governance involves the manner in which 
the business and affairs of banks are governed by their board of directors and senior management which affects 
how they:  
set corporate objectives 
operate the banks’ business on a day-to-day basis  
meet the obligations of accountability to their shareholders and take into account, the interest of other 
stakeholders  
align corporate objectives and behaviour with the expectation that banks will operate in a safe and sound manner 
and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations;  
protect the interest of depositors”.  
 
The existing literatures in some key areas of corporate governance are reviewed with a view to considering their 
strength and short comings. The areas considered are board of directors, board responsibilities, separation of 
chairman from chief executive officer, high quality financial disclosure and huge non- performing loans.    
 
Board of Directors: According to Kumar and Singh (2010), the primary role of the board of directors is that of 
trusteeship to protect and enhance shareholders’ value though strategic supervision. As trustees they will ensure 
that the company has clear goals relating to shareholders’ value and its growth. They should set strategic goals 
and seek accountability for their fulfillment. They will provide direction, and exercise appropriate control to 
ensure that the company is managed in a manner that fulfills stakeholders’ aspirations and societal expectations. 
The board must periodically review its own functioning to ensure that it is fulfilling its role.  
 
There must be a balanced board, consisting of executive and non-executive directors, the latter including 
independent professionals. The executive directors, including the executive chairman, shall not generally exceed 
1/3rd of the total strength of the board. The non-executive directors shall comprise eminent professionals drawn 
from amongst persons with experience in business/ finance/ law/ public enterprises. The directors shall be 
appointed/re-appointed for a period of three to five years, and in the case of executive directors up to the date of 
their retirement, whichever is earlier. The board shall determine from time to time the retirement age for both 
executive and non-executive and non-executive directors. The board shall specify the maximum number of 
company directorships which can be held by members of the board (Kumar and Singh 2010). The non-executive 
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directors are however expected to play a critical role in imparting balance to the board processes by bringing an 
independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, standard of company conduct, etc.  
 
Board Responsibilities: Sanusi (2002) contends that the governance of banks rest with the board of directors. 
For this reason the board should ensure that the bank is run with integrity, complies with all legal requirements 
and regulatory standard and conduct its business in accordance with high ethical standard. Diplock (2004) opines 
that effective corporate governance is all about board’s performance. The task of governing a corporate entity is 
the work of board of directors. For a board to function effectively, it should be composed of members who are 
independent, skilled, knowledgeable, experienced and of diverse perspectives. Chukwudire (2004) contends that 
Nigeria has had high profile cases of corporate failure which are traceable to weak and ineffective boards. In 
some cases, the board appears to have been dormant. Members of such boards are satisfied with having business 
cards that identify them as board members. In a number of cases, the boards become a part of management rather 
than an active monitor of its performance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
High Quality Financial Disclosure: Cheserem,, Bowes, Garratt, Gillibrand, Jayamaha, Laferla, Mortlock  & 
Reddy (2000) observe that an essential complement to sound corporate governance is the implementation of 
robust financial disclosure requirements for corporate and financial institutions. Financial disclosure is essential 
as a means of strengthening the accountability of directors and senior management and enhancing the incentives 
for risk management. It is also essential if market participants and observers – particularly the larger creditors of 
banks, financial news media, financial analysts and rating agencies – are to effectively monitor the performance 
and soundness of financial institutions and exercise appropriate disciplines on those institutions which do not 
perform well or fail to meet acceptable prudential standards. Financial disclosure is also essential if smaller 
creditors, including depositors of banks, are to have any chance of protecting their own interests, particularly in 
the absence of deposit insurance. 
Huge Non-Performing Loans A major revelation showed that many owners and directors abused or misused 
their privileged positions or breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in self serving activities. The abuses 
included granting of unsecured credit facilities to owners, directors and related companies which in some cases 
were in excess of their banks’ statutory lending limits, in violation of the provisions of the law (Oluyemi, 2005).  
2.1  Theoretical Framework 
Agency Theory: This theory is of the position that in the presence of information asymmetry, the agent who 
may be a director or a manager is likely to pursue interests that may hurt the principal or share-holders (Ross, 
1973; Fama, 1980). At first the theory was applied to the relationship between managers and equity holders with 
no explicit recognition of other parties interested in the well-being of the firm. This owner/manager theory views 
shareholders as the true owner of the firm. Thus, bondholders and other lenders, workers and local authorities 
have no real say in the actions of the firm even though they have rights to certain flow of income. Workers have 
the right to be paid wages and local authorities have rights to be paid taxes due hence the residual claimants with 
respect to both control and income and the shareholders. The owners had imperfect information concerning the 
opportunities facing managers and could not by looking at outcomes; infer whether or not managers had made 
the decisions. The imperfection of information necessitated the delegation of responsibilities to managers as 
managers not only knew this but could take actions that exacerbated the asymmetries of information enhancing 
managers’ discretionary authority (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).    
 
In analyzing the agency problem, Jensen and Meckling (1976), develop a theory of the ownership structure of a 
firm. The basis for their analysis is the perspective that a corporation is “a legal fiction which serves as a nexus 
for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the 
assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without the permission of the other 
contracting individuals”. The particular focus on this model is the contract of an agency relationship between a 
principal (the external owner of the firm) and an agent (the owner-managers, or entrepreneur). They demonstrate 
that as the owner’s manager’s fraction of the equity falls (as more equity is sold to outside investors), the utility 
maximizing agent has the incentive to appropriate a large amount of the corporations’ resources in the form of 
perquisites and to exert less than full efforts to create value for shareholders.  
 
According to Peterson (2010), agency theory explains, predicts, and sets the limits of relationships between 
financial parties. Theoretically, desired executive performance is assured in exchange for compensation when he 
meets the needs of his/her organization as a financial steward. When the executive chooses to manipulate the 
financial results through managerial activity and that activity maximizes the return to the executive rather than 
financial return to an organization in the form of return on investment or equity we say there is an agency 
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problem. Preston (2010) also observes that in the case of agency theory, much of this voluminous literature 
relates to how management, as agent of shareholders, align their interests with those of the company through 
tools (for instance salaries, options, contracts, and bonus plans) created by boards of directors when there is 
limited information and a bounding of rationality in the judgment process. In this regard, agency theory can be 
used to explain some of the behavior between them. The essential emphasis is that agency is characterized by the 
risk attitudes of principals and agents. According to Eisenhardt (1989) where principals are considered risk 
neutral in their preferences for individual firm actions, since they can diversify their holdings across multiple 
business opportunities. They use agents, managers, to carry out their plans, using control tools like employment 
security as an agent, income, bonus, or contract. In the absence of (or to enhance) these tools, the literature also 
suggests that a trust relationship can be established that can lower agency costs and establish another agency tool 
that predicts performance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Agents, on the other hand, are assumed to be risk averse (Meyer, et al, 1995), They want to lower risk to their 
personal wealth, and will work to complete goals in order to not endanger outcomes. This risk differential 
between agents and principals creates a moral hazard problem between agency in the principal agent relationship 
where agents are faced with a wide range of goals and incentives that may or may not be in the true interests of 
the firm, but rather are perceived to be so (or may not be at all, e.g. Enron) by the board. The challenge of 
corporate governance is to shore up supervisory and alignment mechanisms that alter the risk orientation of 
agents to align them with the interests of principals, However, Peterson (2010) further observes that agency 
dilemmas exist when there is more than one principal conducting business with one agent. The conflict of 
interest resulting from multiple objectives provided by many principals results in the desire to complete all 
objectives, but result in the partial accomplishment of some. 
Fiduciary Duties: Macey and O’Hara (2003) opines that on a theoretical level, the problems of corporate 
governance result from the existence of incomplete contracts. The rules of corporate governance are aimed at 
resolving the gaps left in these contracts in ways consistent with maximizing the value of the firm. In the case of 
shareholders’ contingent contracts  in the United States, the background rules are called fiduciary duties. The 
economic justification for having fiduciary duties is straightforward: “Fiduciary duties are the mechanism 
invented by the legal system for filling in the unspecified term of shareholders’ contingent (contracts).”7 the 
creation of a contract covering all possible contingencies is impossible between shareholders and boards of 
directors. Relying only on an incomplete contract to define the relationship between shareholders and directors 
would lead to unacceptably high monitoring cost on both sides the presence of fiduciary duties attempts to 
address these contingencies. In this gap-filling role, fiduciary duties essentially call on directors to work hard and 
to promote the interest of shareholders above their own. They argue that, to the extent that fiduciary duties lower 
agency cost by reducing the freedom of management to act in its own unconstrained self-interest, such duties 
will be especially valuable devices in the banking context because of the inherent difficulties in monitoring 
banks.   
 
Akinsulire (2002) opines that a possible conflict can arise when ownership is separated from the day to day 
management of an organization. In larger companies, ordinary shares are likely going to be diversely held and so 
the actions of shareholders are likely going to be restricted in practical terms. The responsibility of running the 
company will be with the board of directors who may only own a small percentage of the shares in issue. The 
management of an organization is essentially agents for the shareholders, being tasked with running the 
organization in the shareholders best interests. The shareholders however have little opportunity to assess 
whether the managers are acting in the shareholders’ best interests. 
 
According to Van Horne (2002), we may think of management as agents of the owners. Stockholders, hoping 
that the agents will act in the stockholders’ best interest, delegate decision making authority to them. Jensen and 
Meckling were indeed the first to develop a comprehensive agency theory of the firm. They show that the 
principals, in our case, the stockholders, can assure themselves that the agent (management) will make optimal 
decisions only if appropriate incentives are given and only if the agent is monitored. Monitoring, however, can 
be done by bonding the agent, systematically reviewing management perquisites, auditing financial statements 
and explicitly limiting management decisions Thus, the existing evidences on corporate governance strongly 
suggest that some managerial actions are inconsistent with the maximization of shareholders’ interest and those 
of the stakeholders’. Hence, there is the possibility of people behaving both as opportunistic, self serving agents 
and selfless stewards.  
 
There is no theory/model of society that is likely to be sufficient for understanding, evaluating or designing 
governance structures. The reliance on just one theory or one perspective may unlikely be rewarding in practical 
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terms for corporate governance system. Nevertheless, this study is hinged on the agency theory which tends to 
suggest that the objectives of the management may differ from those of  
the firm’s stockholders. While the management pursue their own personal interest, which may be detrimental to 
the interest of the shareholders, the latter expects the former to act as loyal and faithful agents. 
3  Methodology 
The source of data collection for the research work was primary in nature. The study made use of structured 
questionnaire as its research design. The study population covers the entire banking sector but the sample size 
was limited to 5 selected banks headquartered in Lagos. A total of 80 staff (16 staff from each of the 5 banks) 
were selected randomly and these were basically head office staff. The 5 banks were also selected at random and 
the 5 banks were Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc, United Bank for Africa Plc and  Access Bank Plc representing 15 
healthy banks declared by the Central Bank of Nigeria and accounting for 20% of the banks in this category.  
The other two were Bank PHB Plc. and Afribank Plc representing the 9 troubled banks and accounting for 
approximately 20% as well. Out of the 80 questionnaire administered to respondents, 72 or (90%) were duly 
filled and returned. In addition to the primary sources, secondary sources were also utilised. Academic journals, 
textbooks, research papers and other materials that were considered useful for the study were consulted. For the 
purpose of this study therefore, a major hypothesis was formulated and this is as stated  underneath: 
Ho: There is no significant relationship between agency and poor corporate governance  
 
4  Data Presentation and Analysis 
 
This study was designed to ascertain the degree of association between poor corporate governance and agency. 
The section focuses essentially on the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the primary data collected 
using a well-structured questionnaire. Statistical Package for Social Sciences was used to analyze the collected 
primary data. In all, the researcher distributed a total of 80 copies of questionnaire to the employees of five 
different banks listed above at their headquarters and within the Lagos environment, out of which 72 were duly 
filled and returned. The response rate is as shown in the table below                                                                                                                                              
 
Section A 
 
Table 1: Respondents Rate of Return 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Returned 72           90 90.0 
Not Returned  8           10                    100.0 
Total          80         100.0                    
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
Table 1 above revealed that (72) or 90% of the respondents filled and returned the questionnaire administered on 
them while (8) or 10% did not return their own questionnaire 
 
Table 2: Sex 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Male 42      58.33 58.33 
Female 30      41.67                    100.0 
Total            72    100.0                   
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
Table 2 shows that (42) or 58.33% of the respondents are male while (30) or 41.67% are female.  
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Table 3: Age 
 Frequency Percentage   Cumulative Percentage 
    21- 30years  36 50.0                 50.0 
    31- 40 years 24  33.33                 83.33 
   41- 50 years 12  16.67                 100.0 
   Total            72       100.0                
 Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
Table 3 shows that (36) or 50% of the respondents are between the ages of 21- 30, (24) or 33.33%  are between 
31- 40 years, while (12) or 16.67% of the respondents are between the ages of 41 years to 50. Thus, majority of 
the respondents are young and are expected to be dynamic in their thinking and approach to issues. 
 
Table 4: Marital Status 
 Frequency Percentage   Cumulative Percentage 
    Single 24 33.33                 33.33 
    Married 42 58 .33                 91.66 
Widow/Divorcee  6  8.34                 100.0 
   Total           72      100.0                
 Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
Table 4 above revealed that (24) or 33.33% were single, (42) or 58.33 were married while only (6) or 8.34% 
were either widow /widower or divorcee. Thus majority or about 92% of the respondents are either married or 
single 
 
Table 5: Work Status 
 Frequency Percentage   Cumulative Percentage 
Top Management 18       25.0                 25.0 
Middle Management 36       50 .0                 75.0 
Junior Staff  18        25.0                 100.0 
   Total           72      100.0                
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
Table 5 shows that (18) or 25% of respondents are top management, (36) or  50.%  of  the respondents are 
middle management staff (18) or 25.% of the respondents are  junior staff. Thus, the survey revealed that most of 
the respondents are from the top management or middle level management cadre. 
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Table 6: Work Experience  
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage 
Below 10 years 20       27.78                27.78 
11- 20years 24       33.33                61.11 
21- 30years 16       22.22                83.33. 
31years and above 12       16.67               100.0 
Total            72     100.0     
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
Table 6 shows that (20) or 27.78% of the respondents had experience of less than 10years, (24) or 33.33%  had 
between11 and 20 years, (16) or 22.22% fall between 21 and 30 years experience while (12) or 16.67% had 
experience of 31 years and above 
 
Section B 
 
For the purpose of this write-up only a few of the most relevant items in the structured questionnaire are picked 
and stated below: 
 
Table 7: Agency role precipitates poor corporate governance 
 Frequency Percentage   Cumulative Percentage 
  Yes          69 95.83                 95.83 
  No 2 2 78                 98.61 
  Not Sure 1 1.39                 100.0 
   Total         72      100.0                
 Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
From Table 7 above, (69) or 95.83% of the respondents agreed that agency role could precipitate poor corporate 
governance. Thus, majority of the respondents agree with this view. 
 
Table 8: There is a significant relationship between agency and poor corporate governance  
 Frequency Percentage E  Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 18  25.0                25 
Agree 46     63.89                88.89 
Not Sure   2       2.78                91.67 
Disagree   5       6.94 98.61 
Strongly Disagree   1        1.39-                             100.0 
Total                 72               100’0 - 
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
The table revealed that (18) or 25% of the respondents strongly agreed that there is a correlation between poor 
corporate governance and agency, (46) or 63 .89% agreed with this viewpoint. About 2.78% were not sure while 
6.94% disagreed with the view. It can be inferred therefore that there is a  
correlation between poor corporate governance and agency. 
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Table 9: Agency impacts negatively on corporate governance   
 Frequency Percentage E  Cumulative Percentage 
Strongly Agree 36  50.0                50 
Agree 18                 25.0                75 
Not Sure  9    12.50                87.50 
Disagree  5        6.94 94.44 
Strongly Disagree 4       5.56                              100.0 
Total              72             100’0 - 
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
 
From the table above, (36) or 50% strongly agreed that agency impacts negatively on corporate governance, (18) 
or 25% also agreed with this view point. Thus, majority of the respondents are of the opinion that agency 
impacts negatively on corporate governance  
 
Testing of Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis for this study is tested using both the student’s  t-test. The results obtained from this test is as 
shown and discussed below. 
 
                   Table 10: One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviations 
Standard 
Error Mean 
There is a significant relationship 
between agency and poor corporate 
governance  
 
72 
 
2.01 
 
.986 
 
.116 
         
Comment: Using the 5 point Likert scale, 1 represents strongly agree, 2 represents agree, 3 represents not sure, 
4 represents disagree and 5 represents strongly disagree,  the mean of 2.01 shows that the average response 
indicates that the respondents agree that there is a significant relationship between agency  and poor corporate 
governance  
      Table 11: One-Simple Test 
 Test Value = 0 
 
 
 
T 
 
 
 
df 
 
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference  
Lower  Upper 
There is a significant relation- 
ship between agency and poor 
corporate governance  
 17.336             
71 
                .000          2.014     1.78               2.25 
 
Comment: The table above shows a two-tailed test with degree of freedom (d.f) 72 – 1=71.The statistical value 
for 0.05 at 71 degree of freedom is 1.99 and the calculated value t = 17.336 is greater than the tabulated value of 
1.99 therefore we accept the alternative hypothesis. (H1). This implies that there is a significant relationship 
between agency and poor corporate governance. 
 
Further Findings and Discussions 
The study was carried out with a view to examining the issue of agency in corporate governance. It was observed 
that directors and the top management act as agents to the shareholders who are the owners of the firm. These 
agents are expected to maximize the benefits accruing to the share holders and also consider the interest of the 
other stakeholders. Unfortunately, both the owners and the agents have conflicting interest. There is usually 
information asymmetry hence the shareholders cannot rightly determine the interest being pursued by the 
agents.The responsibility of the board to the stockholders of the company is to improve corporate value and 
performance, to ensure good growth, market capitalization as well as shareholders’ value and these depend to a 
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greater extent, on the board of directors, that is independently minded.  However, the board of directors of these 
banks together with the management staff do not conform to these expected agency functions.  Rather, they 
pursue their own selfish interest, which is usually, to the detriment of their principals, the owners of the firms. 
 
It was observed that agency has impacted negatively on corporate governance in the Nigeria banking sector. 
Obviously, agency problems arise in wider dimensions.  Between the agents and the principal, there is usually 
lack of transparency and between the agent and other stakeholders there is the problem of non-disclosure of 
material facts that may inform the decisions of the stakeholders.  It was found out that a good number of banks 
conceal vital information from the regulatory authorities by rendering false/ incorrect returns.  It is even worse 
when there is no separation between the management and the board as the executive chairmen will always have 
their ways through the rubber stamp board and pursue interests which run contrary to those of the stockholders 
and the stakeholders.  
 
Table 12 displayed in the study depicts the extent to which the agents can go in granting naked loans to 
themselves and leave the shareholders with nothing to show for their investments .The magnitude of insider 
abuse in some of the failed banks is presented in the table below.             
 
     Table 12: Extent  of Insider Loans to Selected Banks in Liquidation 
S/N |             Bank Ratio of Insider Loans to Total 
Loans (%) 
Ratio of Non-Performing Loans 
to Total Loans (%)                                
1 Financial Merchant Bank                   66.9                      99.5 
2 Kapital Merchant Bank                   50.0                      96.2 
3 Alpha Merchant Bank                   55.0                      90.0 
4 United Commercial Bank                    81.0                      90.0                      
5 Republic Bank                   64.9                      98.0 
6 Commercial Trust Bank                   55-9                    100.0 . 
7 Commerce Bank                  52.0                      86.9 
8 Credite Bank                  76.0                      98.3 
9 Prime Merchant Bank                  80.7                    100.0 
10 Group Merchant Bank                  77.6                      94.5 
11 Nigeria Merchant Bank                  99.9                      95.9 
12 Royal Merchant Bank                  69.0                      98.0 
     Source: NDIC Annual Report (Various Years). 
 
Another serious case in point is that of the ugly incident of poor corporate governance which engulfed the 
Nigerian banking sector in August, 2009 and which ultimately led to the sudden takeover of nine out of the 
twenty- four banks and the immediate sack of their managing and executive directors.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
The study carried out an examination of the role of agency in corporate governance.  It observed the extent to 
which management and the board perform their agency functions.  The study noted that both management and 
the board pursue a different interest altogether from those of the shareholders and other stakeholders.  The 
methodology used involves the collection of primary data and putting them in a frequency table. T-test statistic 
was used to show the degree of association between corporate governance and agency.  In the final analysis, the 
study saw agency as one of the devastating aspect of corporate governance because it breeds, lack of 
transparency, non-disclosure of material information and the granting of insider related credits. The study 
therefore recommends that the banking sector should endeavour to entrench effective corporate governance  that 
will frown at executive duality, weak internal controls, abuses in lending and compel the directors and  
management to be truly and genuinely accountable to the stakeholders. It also recommends that the Central Bank 
of Nigeria should strengthen its enforcement mechanisms such that there will be total transparency and full 
disclosure of all material transactions to the stakeholders and the regulatory authorities.  
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